We propose a purely extensional semantics for higher-order logic programming. In this semantics program predicates denote sets of ordered tuples, and two predicates are equal iff they are equal as sets. Moreover, every program has a unique minimum Herbrand model which is the greatest lower bound of all Herbrand models of the program and the least fixed-point of an immediate consequence operator. We also propose an SLD-resolution proof system which is proven sound and complete with respect to the minimum Herbrand model semantics. In other words, we provide a purely extensional theoretical framework for higher-order logic programming which generalizes the familiar theory of classical (first-order) logic programming.
INTRODUCTION
The two most prominent declarative paradigms, namely logic and functional programming, differ radically in an important aspect: logic programming is traditionally firstorder while functional programming encourages and promotes the use of higher-order functions and constructs. This difference can be partially explained by the fact that higher-order logic fails in terms of vital properties such as completeness and compactness. It would seem, on the face of it, that there would be no hope of finding a complete resolution proof system for higher-order logic programming.
is completely unnatural. The program can however be understood intensionally: the predicate profession is true of the name engineer (which is different than the name tweeter).
On the other hand, there are cases where predicates can be understood from an extensional point of view. Example 1.2. Consider a program that consists only of the following rule: p(Q):-Q(0),Q(1).
In an extensional language, predicate p can be intuitively understood in purely settheoretic terms: p is the set of all those sets that contain both 0 and 1.
It should be noted that this program is also a syntactically acceptable program of the existing intensional logic programming languages. The difference is that in an extensional language the program has a purely set-theoretic semantics. Actually, as we are going to see, this set theoretic interpretation allows us to permit queries of the form:
?-p(R).
which will get meaningful answers (the answer in this case will express the fact that R is any relation which is true of both 0 and 1). Notice that an intensional language will not in general provide an answer in such a query (since there does not exist any actual predicate defined in the program that is true of both 0 and 1).
In this article we will focus on extensional higher-order logic programming. The first work in this area was Wadge [1991] . In that paper, W. W. Wadge demonstrated that there exists a modest fragment of higher-order logic programming that can be understood in purely extensional terms. More specifically, Wadge discovered a simple syntactic restriction which ensures that compliant programs have an extensional declarative reading. The restriction forbids user-defined predicates to appear as arguments in the heads of clauses. For example, the two rules cited already:
profession(engineer). profession(programmer).
violate the restriction. Roughly speaking, the restriction says that rules about predicates can state general principles but cannot pick out a particular predicate for special treatment. Wadge gave several examples of useful extensional higher-order programs and outlined the proof of a minimum-model result. He also showed that in this model the denotations of program predicates are continuous. Continuity can intuitively be understood as a kind of finitaryness. For example, if foo(p) succeeds and foo is continuous, it means there is a finite set of arguments {a 1 , . . . , a k } for which p(a 1 ), . . . , p(a k ) all succeed, and if q(a 1 ), . . . , q(a k ) also succeed, then foo(q) succeeds. Finally, Wadge conjectured that a sound and complete proof system exists for his fragment, but did not further pursue such an investigation. A detailed discussion of Wadge's approach (including its problems and shortcomings) is given in Section 8.
In this article we extend the study initiated in Wadge [1991] and derive the first, to our knowledge, complete theoretical framework for extensional higher-order logic programming, both from a semantic as-well-as from a proof theoretic point of view.
Our first contribution is the development of a novel extensional semantics for higherorder logic programming that is based on algebraic lattices (see, for example, Grätzer [1978] ), a subclass of the familiar complete lattices that have traditionally been used in the theory of first-order logic programming. For every predicate type of our language, algebraic lattices single out a subset of "finite" objects of that type. In other words, the proposed semantics reflects in a direct way the finitary nature of continuity that is implicit in Wadge [1991] . The benefit of the new approach compared to that of Wadge [1991] is that all basic properties and results of classical logic programming are now transferred in the higher-order setting in a natural way. Moreover, the new semantics leads to a relatively simple, sound and complete proof system even for a language that is genuinely more powerful than the one considered in Wadge [1991] . More details on the connections between the two semantical approaches will be given in Section 8.
Our second contribution fixes a shortcoming of Wadge's language by allowing clause bodies and program goals to have uninstantiated higher-order variables. To understand the importance of this extension, consider the following rule for bands (musical ensembles):
band(B):-singer(S),B(S),drummer(D),B(D),guitarist(G),B(G).
This says that a band is a group that has at least a singer, a drummer, and a guitarist. Suppose that we also have a database of musicians as follows.
singer(sally). singer(steve). drummer(dave). guitarist(george). guitarist(grace).
Our extensional higher-order language allows the query ?-band(B). At first sight a query like this seems impractical if not impossible to implement. Since a band is a set, bands can be very large and there can be many (possibly uncountably many) of them. In existing intensional systems such queries usually fail since the program does not provide any information about any particular band.
However, in an extensional context the finitary behavior of the predicates of our language saves us. If the predicate band declares a relation to be a band, then (due to the finitaryness described before) it must have examined only finitely many members of the relation. Therefore we can enumerate the bands by enumerating finite bands, and this collection is countable (in this particular example it is actually finite). Actually, as we are going to see, this enumeration can be performed in a careful way so as that it avoids producing all finite relations one by one (see the discussion in Section 2 that follows).
Our final contribution is a relatively simple proof system for extensional higherorder logic programming, which extends classical SLD-resolution. We demonstrate that the new proof system is sound and complete with respect to the proposed semantics. In particular, the derived completeness theorems generalize the well-known such theorems for first-order logic programming. This result may, at first sight, also seem paradoxical, given the well-known failure of completeness for even second-order logic. But the paradox is resolved by recalling that we are dealing with a restricted subset of higher-order logic and that the denotations of the types of our language are not arbitrary sets but instead algebraic lattices (which have a much more refined structure).
One very important benefit of the proof system is that it gives us an operational semantics for our language. This means in turn that we could probably extend it with cut, negation and other operational features not easily specified in terms of model theory alone.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 presents in a more detailed manner the basic ideas developed in this article. Section 3 introduces the syntax of the higher-order logic programming language H. Section 4 introduces the key lattice-theoretic notions that will be needed in the development of the semantics.
Sections 5 and 6 develop the semantics and the minimum Herbrand model semantics of H; the main properties of the semantics are also established. Section 7 introduces an SLD-resolution proof system for H and establishes its soundness and completeness. Section 8 presents a description of related approaches to higher-order logic programming. Section 9 briefly discusses implementation issues and presents certain interesting topics for future work. The lengthiest among the proofs have been moved to corresponding appendices in order to enhance the readability of the article.
THE PROPOSED APPROACH: AN INTUITIVE OVERVIEW
The purpose of this article is to develop a purely extensional theoretical framework for higher-order logic programming which will generalize the familiar theory of first-order logic programming. The first problem we consider is to bypass one important restriction of Wadge [1991] , namely the inability to handle program clauses or queries that contain uninstantiated predicate variables. The following example illustrates these ideas.
Example 2.1. Consider the following higher-order logic program written in an extended Prolog-like syntax.
p(Q):-Q(0),Q(s(0)). nat(0). nat(s(X)):-nat(X).
The Herbrand universe of the program is the set of natural numbers in successor notation. According to the semantics of Wadge [1991] , the least Herbrand model of the program assigns to predicate p a continuous relation which is true of all unary relations that contain at least 0 and s(0). Consider now the following query.
?-p(R).
which asks for all relations that satisfy p. Such a query seems completely unreasonable, since there exist uncountably many relations that must be substituted and tested in the place of R.
This example illustrates why uninstantiated predicate variables in clauses were disallowed in Wadge [1991] . From a theoretical point of view, one could extend the semantics to cover such cases, but the problem is mainly a practical one: "how can one implement such programs and queries?".
In more formal terms, the least Herbrand model of a higher-order program under the semantics of Wadge [1991] is in general an uncountable set; in our example, this is evidenced by the fact that there exists an uncountable number of unary relations over the natural numbers that contain both 0 and s(0). This observation comes in contrast with the semantics of first-order logic programming in which the least Herbrand model of a program is a countable set. How can one define a proof system that is sound and complete with respect to this semantics? The key idea for bypassing these problems was actually anticipated in the concluding section of Wadge [1991] :
Our higher order predicates, however, are continuous: if a relation satisfies a predicate, then some finite subset satisfies it. This means that we have to examine only finite relations.
In this example, despite the fact that there exists an infinite number of relations that satisfy p, all these relations are supersets of the finite relation {0, s(0)}. In some sense, this finite relation represents all the relations that satisfy p. But how can we make the notion of "finiteness" more explicit? In order to define a sound and complete proof system for an interesting extensional higher-order logic programming language, our semantics must in some sense reflect the "finitary" concepts more explicitly.
An idea that springs to mind is to define an alternative semantics in which variables (like Q in Example 2.1) range over finite relations (and not over arbitrary relations as in Wadge [1991] ). Of course, the notion of "finite" should be appropriately defined for every predicate type. But then an immediate difficulty appears to arise. Given again the program in Example 2.1, and the query
it is not immediately obvious what the meaning of the above is. Since we have assumed that Q ranges over finite relations, how can p be applied to an infinite one? To overcome this problem, observe that in order for the predicate p to succeed for its argument Q, it only has to examine a "finite number of facts" about Q (namely whether Q is true of 0 and s (0)). This remark suggests that the meaning of p(nat) can be established following a nonstandard interpretation of application: we apply the meaning of p to all the "finite approximations" of the meaning of nat, that is, to all finite subsets of the set {0, s(0), s(s(0)), . . .}. In our case p(nat) will be true since there exists a finite subset of the meaning of nat for which the meaning of p is true (namely the set {0, s(0)}).
Notice that the new semantical approach outlined here, heavily relies on the idea that the meaning of predicates (like nat) can be expressed as the least upper bound of a set of simpler (in this case, finite) relations. Actually, this is an old and well-known assumption in the area of denotational semantics, as the following excerpt from Stoy [1977, p. 98] indicates:
So we may reasonably demand of all the value spaces in which we hope to compute that they come equipped with a particular countable subset of elements from which all the other elements may be built up.
As we are going to demonstrate, the meaning of every predicate defined in our language possesses the property just mentioned, and this allows us to use the new nonstandard semantics of application. In fact, as we are going to see, for every predicate type of our language, the set of possible meanings of this type forms an algebraic lattice [Grätzer 1978] ; then, the property is nothing more than the key property which characterizes algebraic lattices (see Proposition 4.14), namely that "every element of an algebraic lattice is the least upper bound of the compact elements of the lattice that are below it." More importantly, for the algebraic lattices we consider, it is relatively easy to identify these compact elements and to enumerate them one by one. Based on the given semantics, we are able to derive for higher-order logic programs many properties that are either identical or generalize the familiar ones from first-order logic programming (see Section 6).
The new semantics allows us to introduce a relatively simple, sound and complete proof system which applies to programs and queries that may contain uninstantiated predicate variables. This is due to the fact that the set of "finite" relations is now countable, and as we are going to see, there exist interesting ways of producing and enumerating them. The key idea can be demonstrated by continuing Example 2.1. Given the query:
one (inefficient and tedious) approach would be to enumerate all possible finite relations of the appropriate type over the Herbrand universe. Instead of this, we use an approach which is based on what we call basic templates: a basic template for R is (intuitively) a finite set whose elements are individual variables. This saves us from having to enumerate all finite sets consisting of ground terms from the Herbrand universe. For example, 2 assume that we instantiate R with the template {X, Y}. Then, the resolution proceeds as follows:
?-p(R) ?-p({X, Y}) ?-{X, Y}(0), {X, Y}(s(0)) ?-{0, Y}(s(0)) ?-true and the proof system will return the answer R = {0, s(0)}. The proof system will also return other finite solutions, such as R = {0, s(0), Z 1 }, R = {0, s(0), Z 1 , Z 2 }, and so on. However, a slightly optimized implementation (see Section 9) can be created that returns only the answer R = {0, s(0)}, which represents all the finite relations produced by the proof system. The intuition behind this answer is that the given query succeeds for all unary relations that contain at least 0 and s(0). Similarly, for the band example of Section 1, the implementation will systematically assemble all the minimal three-member bands from the talents available.
THE HIGHER-ORDER LANGUAGE H: SYNTAX
In this section we introduce the higher-order language H, which extends classical firstorder logic programming to a higher-order setting. The language H is based on a simple type system that supports two base types: o, the boolean domain, and ι, the domain of individuals (data objects). The composite types are partitioned into three classes: functional (assigned to function symbols), predicate (assigned to predicate symbols) and argument (assigned to parameters of predicates).
Definition 3.1. A type can either be functional, argument, or predicate, denoted by σ , ρ and π respectively and defined as:
We will use τ to denote an arbitrary type (either functional, argument or predicate one).
As usual, the binary operator → is right-associative. A functional type that is different than ι will often be written in the form ι n → ι, n ≥ 1. Moreover, it can be easily seen that every predicate type π can be written in the form ρ 1 → · · · → ρ n → o, n ≥ 0 (for n = 0 we assume that π = o).
We can now proceed to the definition of H, starting from its alphabet. ) The abstractor λ and the parentheses "(" and ")".
The set consisting of the predicate variables and the individual variables of H will be called the set of argument variables of H. Argument variables will be usually denoted by V and its subscripted versions.
The existential quantifier in higher-order logic is usually introduced in a different way than in first-order logic. So, for example, in order to express the quantification of the argument variable V of type ρ over the expression E one writes (∃ ρ (λV.E)). For simplicity, we will use in this article the more familiar notation (∃ ρ V E).
We proceed by defining the set of positive expressions of H.
Definition 3.3. The set of positive expressions of the higher-order language H is recursively defined as follows.
(1) Every predicate variable (respectively, predicate constant) of type π is a positive expression of type π ; every individual variable (respectively, individual constant) of type ι is a positive expression of type ι; the propositional constants false and true are positive expressions of type o. (2) If f is an n-ary function symbol and E 1 , . . . , E n are positive expressions of type ι, Notice that (following the tradition of first-order logic programming) we will talk about the "empty clause" which is denoted by 2 and is equivalent to ← true, that is, to the propositional constant false. The union of the sets of positive and clausal expressions of H will be called the set of expressions of H. To denote that an expression E has type τ , we will often write E : τ ; additionally, we write type(E) to denote the type of expression E. Expressions of type ι will be called terms and of type o will be called formulas. We will write ←, ∧ and ∨ instead of ← o , o and o . Moreover, instead of ∃ ρ we will often write ∃. When writing an expression, in order to avoid the excessive use of parentheses, certain usual conventions will be adopted (such as for example the usual priorities between logical constants, the convention that application is left-associative and that lambda abstraction extends as far to the right as possible, and so on). Given an expression E, we denote by FV(E) the set of all free variables of E. By overloading notation, we will also write FV(S), where S is a set of expressions.
Notice that in Definition 3.4, a goal clause may contain two types of occurrences of variables that serve a similar purpose, namely free argument variables and argument variables that are existentially quantified. From a semantic point of view, these two types of variables are essentially the same. However, in a later section we will distinguish them from an operational point of view: the free argument variables that appear in a goal are the ones for which an answer is sought for by the proof system; the argument variables that are existentially quantified are essentially free variables for which an answer is not sought for (something like the underscored variables in Prolog systems). This distinction is not an important one, and we could have proceeded in a different way (e.g., by disallowing existentially quantified variables from goals). 
or even more compactly as follows.
A possible query could be: ← (closure R a b) (which intuitively requests for those binary relations such that the pair (a, b) belongs to their transitive closure). In a Prolog-like extended syntax, this program would have been written as follows:
and the corresponding query as ← closure(R, a, b).
Example 3.7. We define a predicate ordered which checks whether its second argument (a list) is ordered according to its first argument (a binary relation). The type of ordered is π = (ι → ι → o) → ι → o (notice that the type of a list is also ι since a list is nothing more than a term). In Prolog-like syntax, the program is the following.
In the syntax of H (slightly extended with the standard notation for lists), this program can be written as follows.
Assume that we have also defined a binary relation less which succeeds if its first argument (e.g., a natural number) is less than the second one. Then, the query ← ordered less [1, 4, 7, 10 ] is expected to succeed. On the other hand, the query ← ordered R [a,b,c,d ] requests for all binary relations under which the list [a,b,c,d] is ordered. As it will become clear in the subsequent sections of the article, this is a meaningful question which can obtain a reasonable answer.
ALGEBRAIC LATTICES
In order to develop the semantics of H, we first need to introduce certain latticetheoretic concepts. As it is well-known, the standard semantics of classical (first-order) logic programming, is based on complete lattices (see, for example, Lloyd [1987] ). As we are going to see, the development of the semantics of H is based on a special class of complete lattices, namely algebraic lattices (see, for example, Grätzer [1978] ). An algebraic lattice is a complete lattice in which every element can be created by using certain compact (intuitively, "simple") elements of the lattice. In our setting, these compact elements will be the ones that the proof procedure will generate in order to answer queries that involve uninstantiated predicate variables. We should mention at this point that algebraic partially ordered sets are widely used in domain theory (see, for example, Abramsky and Jung [1994] ) and in the semantics of functional languages [Stoy 1977] .
We start by introducing some mathematical preliminaries concerning lattice theory. Since the bibliography on partially ordered sets is huge, certain results appear in one form or another in various contexts, and they are often hard to locate in the exact form needed. Propositions 4.7, 4.10 and 4.14 fall into this category; for reasons of completeness, we have included short proofs (or pointers to such proofs) for them. On the other hand, Lemma 4.17 is, to our knowledge, new. We start with some basic definitions. Definition 4.1. A set P with a binary relation P is called a partially ordered set or poset if P is reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric.
Usually, the subscript P in P will be omitted when it is obvious from context. 
Definition 4.4. Let P be a poset. A subset A of P is directed, if it is nonempty and each pair of elements of A has an upper bound in A. Definition 4.5. Let P and Q be posets. A function f : P → Q is called monotonic if for all x, y ∈ P with x P y, we have f (x) Q f (y). The set of all monotonic functions
Notice that monotonicity can be generalized in the obvious way for functions f : P n → Q, n > 0, since P n is also a poset (where the partial order in this case is defined in a point-wise way).
We are particularly interested in one type of posets, namely, complete lattices.
Definition 4.6. A poset L in which every subset has a least upper bound and a greatest lower bound, is called a complete lattice.
In fact, there is a symmetry here: the existence of all least upper bounds suffices to prove that a poset is indeed a complete lattice, a fact that we will freely use throughout the article. PROPOSITION 4.7. Let P be a poset, L be a complete lattice and let f : P × P → L be a monotonic function. Then, x∈P,y∈P 
PROOF. An easy proof using basic properties of posets (see, for example, the corresponding proof for domains Tennent [1991, Lemma 5.3, page 92] ).
We will write ⊥ L for the greatest lower bound of a complete lattice L (called the bottom element of L). A very useful tool in lattice theory, is Kleene's fixpoint theorem.
Let A be an arbitrary set and L be a complete lattice. Then, a partial order can be defined on
We will often use the following proposition. 
PROOF. We give the proof for (the proof for is symmetrical)
, where the least upper bound is well-defined because L is a complete lattice. Notice that h is obviously an upper bound of F. Now let g be an arbitrary upper bound of F. For each a ∈ A, it holds that g(a) is an upper bound of
It remains to show that h is monotonic. Consider x, y ∈ A such that x y. For all f ∈ F we have f (x) f (y) due to the monotonicity of f .
f ∈F f (y) and consequently h is monotonic.
We will be interested in a certain type of complete lattices in which every element can be "created" by using a set of compact (intuitively, "simple") elements of the lattice. We can now define the notion of algebraic lattice (see, for example, Grätzer [1978] ), which will prove to be the key lattice-theoretic concept applicable to our context. Definition 4.12. A complete lattice L is called algebraic if every element of L is the least upper bound of a set of compact elements of L.
The name "algebraic lattice" is due to Birkhoff [1967] (who did not assume completeness at that time). In the literature, algebraic lattices are also called compactly generated lattices.
Example 4.13. Consider the set L = {false, true} under the ordering false ≤ true, false ≤ false and true ≤ true. Then, L is an algebraic lattice with K(L) = {false, true}. Actually, every finite complete lattice is algebraic.
Let S be a set. Then, 2 S , the set of all subsets of S, forms a complete lattice under set inclusion. It is easy to see that this is an algebraic lattice whose compact elements are the finite subsets of S.
Let P be a poset. Given B ⊆ P and x ∈ P, we write B [x] = {b ∈ B | b P x}. We have the following easy proposition: [x] x. We show that x K(L) [x] . By Definition 4.12, there exists [x] and consequently x K(L) [x] .
PROOF. Obviously it holds that K(L)
Given an algebraic lattice L, the set
In the rest of this section we will define a particular class of algebraic lattices that arise in our semantics of higher-order logic programming. This class will be characterized by Lemma 4.17 that follows. We first need to define the notion of "step functions" (see, for example, Abramsky and Jung [1994] ) which are used to build the compact elements of our algebraic lattices.
Definition 4.15. Let A be a poset and L be an algebraic lattice. For each a ∈ A and c ∈ K(L), we define the function (a c) :
The functions of the above form will be called the step functions of A → L.
One can view the step function (a c) as a c-valued characteristic function (i.e., as a function which assigns the c value to all elements of the subset {x ∈ A | a A x} of A, and ⊥ L to the rest of the elements of A).
Example 4.16. Consider a nonempty set A equipped with the trivial partial order of equality (i.e., the partial order that relates every element of A only to itself). Moreover, let L = {false, true} (which by Example 4.13 is an algebraic lattice). Then, for every a ∈ A, (a true) is the function that returns true iff its argument is equal to a. In other words (a true) is the characteristic function that corresponds to the singleton set {a}. On the other hand, for every a, (a false) corresponds to the empty set. As a second example, assume that A is the set of finite subsets of N and that L = {false, true}. Then, for any finite set a ∈ A, (a true) is the function that given any finite set x such that x ⊇ a, (a true)(x) = true. In other words, (a true) is the characteristic function that corresponds to a set consisting of a and all its (finite) supersets. On the other hand, for every a, (a false) is the function that given any finite set x, (a false)(x) = false, that is, it corresponds to the empty set (of sets).
The following lemma, which we have not seen explicitly stated before, identifies a class of algebraic lattices that will play the central role in the development of the semantics of higher-order logic programming. An important characteristic of these lattices is that they have a simple characterization of their bases. The proof of the lemma is given in the Electronic Appendix, Section A. We can now outline the reasons why algebraic lattices play such an important role in our context. As we have already mentioned, one of the contributions of this article is that it allows the treatment of queries with uninstantiated predicate variables. The results of Wadge [1991] indicate that (due to continuity), if a relation satisfies a predicate, then some "finite representative" of this relation also satisfies it. This gives the idea of defining a semantics which makes these "finite representatives" more explicit. Intuitively, these finite representatives are the compact elements of an algebraic lattice. From an operational point of view, restricting attention to the compact elements allows us to answer queries with uninstantiated variables: if the set of compact elements is enumerable then we can try them one by one examining in each case whether the query is satisfied.
More formally, since our lattices are algebraic and satisfy the conditions of Lemma 4.17, we have a relatively easy characterization of their sets of compact elements (as suggested by Lemma 4.17). Moreover, as we are going to see, if we restrict attention to Herbrand interpretations (see Section 6), then the lattices that we have to consider are all ω-algebraic and therefore their sets of compact elements are countable. For these lattices it turns out that we can devise an effective procedure for enumerating their compact elements which leads us to an effective proof system for our higher-order language.
THE SEMANTICS OF H
The semantics of H is built upon the notion of algebraic lattice. Recall that an algebraic lattice is a complete lattice L with the additional property that every element x of L is the least upper bound of K(L) [x] .
The Semantics of Types
Before specifying the semantics of expressions of H we need to provide the set-theoretic meaning of the types of expressions of H with respect to a set D (where D is later going to be the domain of our interpretations). The fact that a given type τ denotes a set τ D will mean that an expression of type τ denotes an element of τ D . In other words, the semantics of types helps us understand what are the meanings of the expressions of our language. In the following definition we define simultaneously and recursively two things: the semantics τ D of a type τ and the corresponding partial order τ . 3 3 Notice that we are writing τ instead of the more accurate τ D . In the following, for brevity reasons we will often use the former (simpler) notation. Similarly, we will often write ⊥ π instead of ⊥ π D .
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Definition 5.1. Let D be a nonempty set. Then: 
and ι→π is the partial order defined as follows: for all
, and π 1 →π 2 is the partial order defined as follows:
It is not immediately obvious that the last case in this definition is well-defined. More specifically, in order for the quantity K( π 1 D ) to make sense, π 1 D must be a complete lattice. This is ensured by the following lemma.
LEMMA 5.2. Let D be a nonempty set. Then, for every π , π D is an algebraic lattice (ω-algebraic if D is countable).
PROOF. The proof is by induction on the structure of π . The basis case is for π = o and holds trivially (see Example 4.13). For the induction step, we distinguish two cases. The first case is for
Notice now that D is partially ordered by the trivial partial order ι , and it holds that
(monotonicity is trivial in this case). By the induction hypothesis and Lemma 4.17 it follows that π D is an algebraic lattice (ω-algebraic if D is countable).
The second case is for π = π 1 → π 2 , and the result follows by the induction hypothesis and Lemma 4.17.
The following definition gives us a convenient shorthand when we want to refer to an object that is either a compact element or a member of the domain D of our interpretations. This shorthand will be used in various places in the article.
Definition 5.3. Let D be a nonempty set and let ρ be an argument type. Define:
The set F D (ρ) will be called the set of basic elements of type ρ (with respect to the set D).
Example 5.4. Consider the type ι → o (a first-order predicate with one argument has this type). By Definition 5.1, ι → o D is the set of all functions from D to {false, true} (or equivalently, of all subsets of D).
As a second example, consider the type (ι → o) → o. This is the type of a predicate which takes as its only parameter a unary predicate which is first-order; for example, p in Example 2.1 has this type. Then, it can be verified using Lemma 4.17 and 
to {false, true}. In other words, in the semantics of H, a predicate of type (ι → o) → o will denote a monotonic function from finite subsets of D to {false, true}. The role that monotonicity plays in this context can be intuitively explained by considering again Example 2.1: if p is true of a finite set, then this set must contain both 0 and s(0). But then, p will also be true for every superset of this set (since every superset also contains both 0 and s(0)). As we are going to see, the meaning of all the higher-order predicates that are defined in a program will possess the monotonicity property.
Notice now that in our interpretation of types, only monotonicity is required; actually, continuity is not applicable in our interpretation: given a type π 1 → π 2 , it would be meaningless to talk about the continuous functions from
is not in general a complete lattice 4 as required by the definition of continuity. However, as we are going to see, monotonicity suffices in order to establish that the immediate consequence operator of every program is continuous (Lemma 6.11) and therefore has a least fixed-point.
As a last remark, we should mention that the interpretation of types given in Definition 5.1, does not apply to the inverse implication operator ← π of H, whose denotation is not monotonic (for example, notice that negation can be implicitly defined with the use of implication). However, since the use of ← π is not allowed inside positive expressions, the nonmonotonicity of ← π does not create any semantic problems.
The Semantics of Expressions
We can now proceed to give meaning to the expressions of H. This is performed by first defining the notions of interpretation and state for H: In the following, s[d/V] is used to denote a state that is identical to s the only difference being that the new state assigns to V the value d.
Before we proceed to formally define the semantics of expressions of H, a short discussion on the semantics of application is needed. The key technical difficulty we have to confront can be explained by reconsidering Example 2.1 in the more formal context that we have now developed.
Example 5.7. Consider again the following program from Example 2.1.
Consider also the query ← p(nat). The type of p is (ι → o) → o, while the type of nat is ι → o. Let I be an interpretation with underlying domain D. Then, according to Definition 5.5, I(p) must be a monotonic function from
consists of all the finite sets of elements of D. But I(nat) is a member of ι → o D and can therefore be an infinite set. How can we apply I(p) to I(nat)? To overcome this problem, observe that in order for the predicate p to succeed for its argument Q, it only has to examine a "finite number of facts" about Q (namely whether Q is true of 0 and s (0)). This remark suggests that the meaning of p(nat) can be established following a nonstandard interpretation of application: we apply I(p) to all the "finite approximations" of I(nat), that is, to all elements of K( ι → o D ) [I(nat)] , and then take the least upper bound of the results. Notice that our approach heavily relies on the fact that our semantic domains are algebraic lattices: every element of such a lattice (like I(nat) in our example) is the least upper bound of the compact elements of the lattice that are below it (the finite subsets of I(nat) in our case).
We can now proceed to present the semantics of H.
Definition 5.8. Let I be an interpretation of H, let D be the domain of I, and let s be a state over D. Then, the semantics of expressions of H with respect to I and s, is defined as follows.
(1) false
For closed expressions E we will often write E (I) instead of E s (I) (since, in this case, the meaning of E is independent of s).
We need to demonstrate that the semantic valuation function · assigns to every expression of H an element of the corresponding semantic domain. More formally, we need to establish that for every interpretation I with domain D, for every state s over D and for all expressions E : ρ, it holds that E s (I) ∈ ρ D . In order to prove this, the following definition is needed.
Definition 5.9. Let S H,D be the set of states of H over the nonempty set D. We define the following partial order on S H,D : for all
The following lemma states that Definition 5.8 assigns to expressions elements of the corresponding semantic domain. Notice that in order to establish this, we must also prove simultaneously that the meaning of positive expressions is monotonic with respect to states. 
The proof of the lemma is given in the Electronic Appendix, Section B.
We can now define the important notion of a model of a set of formulas.
Definition 5.11. Let S be a set of formulas of H and let I be an interpretation of H. We say that I is a model of S if for every F ∈ S and for every state s over the domain of I, F s (I) = true.
We close this section with the definitions of the notions of unsatisfiability and of logical consequence of a set of formulas.
Definition 5.12. Let S be a set of formulas of H. We say that S is unsatisfiable if no interpretation of H is a model for S. Definition 5.13. Let S be a set of formulas and F be a formula of H. We say that F is a logical consequence of S if, for every interpretation I of H, I is a model of S implies that I is a model of F.
Discussion on the Semantics
There are certain aspects of the semantics developed in this section, that deserve a further discussion. In this subsection we present at an intuitive level the main reasons that led us to specific decisions regarding the semantics of H.
One first observation is that our interpretation of types in Definition 5.1 is not the standard one: the denotation of π 1 → π 2 is not the set of all relations from the denotation of π 1 to the denotation of π 2 . Wadge [1991] , interpreted types in the standard way and attempted, based on this interpretation, to establish a minimum model property for higher-order logic programs. However, as we explain in detail in Subsection 8, the proof of the minimum model theorem given in Wadge [1991] based on the standard interpretation, contains a flaw. In other words, the standard interpretation of types does not lead to a minimum Herbrand model semantics for higher-order logic programs. This is one reason that led us to the interpretation of types given in Definition 5.1. Notice that such restrictions in the interpretation of types are quite mainstream in the denotational semantics of programming languages. For example, in the semantics of functional languages, the denotation of a type of the form τ 1 → τ 2 is the set of all continuous functions from the denotation of τ 1 to the denotation of τ 2 .
A second (related) observation that seems to require further explanation is that in the semantics of types,
The reason for this decision has been presented in an intuitive way in Section 2 and we can now re-explain it in a slightly more formal manner. Assume that we want to provide a proof system for programs of H. Consider a goal clause of the form ←p(R), where p is defined in our program and has type
, then the proof system would face the impossible task of examining all the uncountably many relations of type ι → o for possible solutions. If on the other hand we follow the interpretation of types given in Definition 5.1, then the set K( ι → o D ) is the set of all finite relations, which can be enumerated. But then this creates the obvious question: "how do we know that we don't miss anything by restricting attention to the compact elements of a domain?" In our running example, this could be also expressed as follows: "how do we know that by restricting attention to the finite relations we don't miss any interesting infinite ones?" The answer to this question can be given by appealing to our intuitions about programs: when the program predicate p succeeds for an infinite relation, then it does so after a finite amount of time and therefore it has only checked a finite amount of information about this relation. In other words, the behavior of p can be described by what it does on finite relations.
This discussion also intuitively explains our nonstandard definition of application (see also the discussion in Example 5.7). It also explains why in our semantics the argument variables are permitted to only range over the compact elements of the corresponding domain. 5 For example, consider a predicate constant p of type π = (ι → o) → o, that is defined in a program as p ← π λR.(· · · ). Then, according to the interpretation of π , R ranges over K( ι → o D ) and this explains why in the case of the semantics of λ-abstraction in Definition 5.8 the bound variable is required to range over compact elements.
Finally, one might wonder why we have insisted on demonstrating that the lattices that show-up in our semantics, are algebraic. In other words, why does it not suffice to use the compact elements of the lattice regardless of whether they suffice to describe all elements or not. Intuitively, the algebraicity of our lattices ensures that the new notion of application we introduce is equivalent to the standard one. Alternatively, when we apply a function to an argument, we don't lose anything if we apply the function to all the finite approximations of the argument and take the least upper bound of the results. In other words, the algebraicity ensures that we can decompose the argument of an application without losing any information. A second advantage of the fact that our domains are algebraic lattices is that we know exactly which are the compact elements of our lattice (see Lemma 4.17). In an arbitrary complete lattice we would first have to somehow find and characterize all the compact elements of the lattice for all types, and of course prove that they are indeed compact. This would probably require an effort that is comparable to that invested in the present formulation, and wouldn't convey the additional information that the lattices we employ belong to a well-known and broadly studied class of lattices. It is important to stress that algebraic lattices are very familiar structures in domain theory and they have been used extensively since the inception of denotational semantics (see, for example, Abramsky and Jung [1994] ).
MINIMUM HERBRAND MODEL SEMANTICS
Herbrand interpretations constitute a special form of interpretations that have proven to be a cornerstone of first-order logic programming. Analogously, we have the following.
Definition 6.1. The Herbrand universe U H of H is the set of all terms that can be formed out of the individual constants and the function symbols of H. Definition 6.2. A Herbrand interpretation I of H is an interpretation such that:
(1) the domain of I is the Herbrand universe U H of H; (2) for every individual constant c, I(c) = c; (3) for every predicate constant p of type π , I(p) ∈ π U H ; (4) for every n-ary function symbol f and for all t 1 , . . .
Notice that this interpretation of terms is being performed in exactly the same way as in classical (first-order) logic programming. However, the way that predicates are interpreted here is an extension of the way that predicates are treated in classical logic programming (in which the arguments of predicates are just elements of the Herbrand universe).
Since all Herbrand interpretations have the same underlying domain, we will often refer to a "Herbrand state s," meaning a state whose underlying domain is U H . As it is a standard practice in logic programming, we will often refer to an "interpretation of a program P" rather than of the underlying language H. In this case, we will implicitly assume that the set of individual constants and function symbols are those that appear in P. Under this assumption, we will often talk about the "Herbrand universe U P of P."
We should also note that since programs are finite, the Herbrand universe of a program is always a countable set. Then, by Lemma 5.2 we get that for every program P and for every predicate type π , π U P is an ω-algebraic lattice (i.e., it has a countable basis).
The definition of a "Herbrand model" is the usual one.
Definition 6.3. A Herbrand model of a program P is a Herbrand interpretation that is a model of P.
We can now proceed to examine properties of Herbrand interpretations. In the following we denote the set of Herbrand interpretations of a program P with I P .
Definition 6.4. Let P be a program. We define the following partial order on I P : for all I, J ∈ I P , I I P J iff for every π and for every predicate constant p : π of P,
LEMMA 6.5. Let P be a program and let I ⊆ I P . Then, for every predicate p of P, ( I)(p) = I∈I I(p) and ( I)(p) = I∈I I(p). Therefore, I P is a complete lattice under I P . PROOF. We give the proof for ; the proof for is symmetrical and omitted. Let J ∈ I P such that for every p : π in P, J(p) = I∈I I(p). Notice that I∈I I(p) is welldefined since π U P is a complete lattice. Notice also that J is an upper-bound for I because for every I ∈ I, I I P J. Let J be an arbitrary upper bound of I. Then, for every p : π , it holds that J (p) is an upper bound of {I(p) | I ∈ I}, and therefore I∈I I(p) π J (p), which implies that J I P J . In the following we denote with ⊥ I P the greatest lower bound of I P , that is, the interpretation which for every π , assigns to each predicate p : π of P the element ⊥ π .
The properties of monotonicity and continuity of the semantic valuation function will prove vital. LEMMA 6.6 (MONOTONICITY OF SEMANTICS). Let P be a program and let E : ρ be a positive expression of P. Let I, J be Herbrand interpretations and s be a Herbrand state of P.
The proof of the lemma is given in the Electronic Appendix, Section C. LEMMA 6.7 (CONTINUITY OF SEMANTICS). Let P be a program and let E be a positive expression of P. Let I be a directed set of Herbrand interpretations and s be a Herbrand state of P. Then, E s ( I) = I∈I E s (I).
The proof of the lemma is given in the Electronic Appendix, Section D.
All the basic properties of first-order logic programming extend naturally to the higher-order case. PROOF. By Lemma 6.5, M is well-defined. Assume that M is not a model for P. Then, there exists a rule p ← π E in P and basic elements b 1 , . . . , b n of the appropriate types such that
By Proposition 4.10 we conclude that for some M ∈ M, M(p) b 1 · · · b n = false. But then there exists M ∈ M that does not satisfy the rule p ← π E, and therefore is not a model of P (contradiction).
It is straightforward to check that every higher-order program P has at least one Herbrand model I, namely the one which for every predicate constant p of P and for all basic elements b 1 , . . . , b n of the appropriate types, I(p) b 1 · · · b n = true. Notice that this model generalizes the familiar idea of "Herbrand Base" that is used in the theory of first-order logic programming.
Since the set of models of a higher-order logic program is nonempty, the intersection (glb) of all Herbrand models is well-defined and by Theorem 6.8 is a model of the program. We will denote this model by M P .
Definition 6.9. Let P be a program. The mapping T P : I P → I P is defined as follows for every p : π in P and for every I ∈ I P :
The mapping T P will be called the immediate consequence operator for P.
The fact that T P is well-defined is verified by the following lemma.
LEMMA 6.10. Let P be a program and let p : π be a predicate constant of P. Then, for every I ∈ I P , T P (I)(p) ∈ π U P .
PROOF. The result follows directly by the definition of T P , Lemma 5.10 and the fact that π U P is a complete lattice.
The key property of T P is that it is continuous. LEMMA 6.11. Let P be a program. Then the mapping T P is continuous.
PROOF. Straightforward using Lemma 6.7.
The following property of T P generalizes the corresponding well-known property from first-order logic programming. LEMMA 6.12. Let P be a program and let I ∈ I P . Then I is a model of P if and only if T P (I) I P I.
PROOF. An interpretation I ∈ I P is a model of
Define now the following sequence of interpretations.
We have the following theorem (which is entirely analogous to the one for the firstorder case).
THEOREM 6.13. Let P be a program.
PROOF. Using exactly the same reasoning as in the first-order case (see, for example, the corresponding proof in Lloyd [1987] ).
Closing this section, we feel it is important to discuss certain desirable characteristics of the minimum Herbrand model semantics. First of all, in the proposed semantics, the denotation of a user-defined predicate is literally a set of tuples of compact elements and this fact directly renders the extensionality rule applicable. For example, if p is of type (ι → o) → o, then the meaning of p is the set of all finite sets for which p is true. Consider now another predicate of the same type, say q, which is true of the same finite sets as p. Then, obviously, p and q are equal as sets. From a programming point of view, extensionality means that p can be replaced by q in any program without changing the output of the program. For example, if r is of type ((ι → o) → o) → o, then, by the semantics of application, r(p) has the same meaning as r(q).
In a slightly different direction, this discussion implies that under the proposed semantics, we can make changes to a predicate's definition and as long as our transformations preserve the predicate's extension, the enclosing program retains its meaning. Semantics preserving transformations are a vital part of any programming paradigm; the proposed semantics is actually a formal tool for the justification of such transformations. Therefore, all the benefits of extensionality that were highlighted in Wadge [1991, pp. 299-300] , continue to hold under the proposed semantics.
Apart from extensionality, the proposed semantics also possesses the potential of being useful in proving properties of programs. In the theory of programming languages, many properties of programs can be proved using induction on the approximations of the least fixed-point of the program (see, for example, Stoy [1977, pp. 209-217] ). Due to the inductive definition of T P ↑ ω, similar proofs can also be performed in our setting. In conclusion, using the proposed semantics for the understanding and analysis of higher-order logic programs appears to be one of the most promising next steps in our work.
A PROOF SYSTEM
In this section we propose a sound and complete proof system for the programs of H. One important aspect we initially have to resolve, is how to represent basic elements (see Definition 5.3) in our source language. In the following subsection we introduce a class of positive expressions, namely basic expressions, which are the syntactic analogues of basic elements. Basic expressions will be used in the formalization of the notion of answer (to a given query) as-well-as in the development of the SLD-resolution proof system.
Basic Expressions
As we have already seen, basic elements have played an important role in the development of the semantics of our higher-order logic programming language. In order to devise a sound and complete proof system for the programs of H, we first need to find a syntactic representation for basic elements. Since the definition of basic elements uses the operator (see Lemma 4.17, Definition 4.15, and Definition 5.3), it is not immediately obvious how one can construct a positive expression whose meaning coincides with a given basic element. Basic expressions introduced further on will solve this apparent difficulty.
Definition 7.1. The set of basic expressions of H is recursively defined as follows. Every expression of H of type ι is a basic expression of type ι. Every predicate variable of H of type π is a basic expression of type π . The propositional constants false and true are basic expressions of type o. A nonempty finite union of expressions, each one of which has the following form, is a basic expression of type ρ 1 → · · · → ρ n → o (where The B i and B kl will be called the basic subexpressions of B.
The following example illustrates the ideas behind Definition 7.1.
Example 7.2. We consider various cases of Definition 7.1.
-The terms a, f(a,b), X and f(X,h(Y)), are basic expressions of type ι. }, or more simply to the finite set {a, b}.
Intuitively, it corresponds to the basic element ( {(a true), (b true)}) true. More simply, it corresponds to the set of all finite sets that contain both a and b.
The proof system that will be developed later in this section, relies on a special form of basic expressions.
Definition 7.3. The set of basic templates of H is the subset of the set of basic expressions of H defined as follows.
-The propositional constants false and true are basic templates. -Every nonempty finite union of basic expressions (of the form presented in items 1 and 2 of Definition 7.1) in which all the basic subexpressions involved are distinct variables, is a basic template.
The distinct variables mentioned before, will be called template variables. Notice from this example that the structure of basic templates is in general much simpler than that of basic expressions (due to the fact that a template variable can represent an arbitrary basic expression of the same type). For this reason, basic templates are much simpler to enumerate than arbitrary basic expressions.
The following two lemmas establish the connections between basic elements and basic expressions.
LEMMA 7.5. For every basic expression B : ρ, for every Herbrand interpretation I of H, and for every Herbrand state s, B s (I) ∈ F U H (ρ).
PROOF. The proof is by induction on the type of B. The basis case is for basic expressions of type ι and o and holds trivially. We demonstrate that the lemma holds for basic expressions of type ρ = ρ 1 → · · · → ρ n → o, assuming that it holds for all basic expressions that have simpler types than ρ. If the basic expression is a predicate variable, the result is immediate; otherwise, we have to distinguish the following cases:
Case 1: B = λV 1 . · · · λV n .false. Then, the corresponding basic element in F U H (ρ) is the bottom element of type ρ 1 → · · · → ρ n → o (i.e., ⊥ ρ 1 →···→ρ n →o ). 
, where m > 0. In the former case it is b i =⊥ ρ i ; in the latter case
Case 3: B is a finite union of lambda abstractions. Then, for each term of the finite union we can create (as before) a basic element. By taking the finite union of these elements, we create the basic element that corresponds to B. It can be easily verified that for every basic expression B, B s (I) coincides with the corresponding basic element defined as before.
The converse of this lemma holds, as the following lemma demonstrates.
LEMMA 7.6. Let ρ be any argument type and let b ∈ F U H (ρ). Then, there exists a closed basic expression B : ρ such that for every Herbrand interpretation I, B (I) = b.
PROOF. The proof is by induction on the structure of argument types. The basis case is for argument types ι and o, and holds trivially. We demonstrate that the lemma holds for type ρ = ρ 1 → · · · → ρ n → o, assuming that it holds for all subtypes of ρ. Assume now that b is a basic element of type ρ, consisting of a finite union of step functions.
If the union is empty, then B = λV 1 . · · · λV n .false. Assume now that the union is nonempty. Then, the basic expression corresponding to b will simply be the union of the basic expressions corresponding to the step functions that comprise b. ( These two lemmas suggest that basic expressions are the syntactic analogues of basic elements.
Substitutions and Unifiers
Substitutions are vital in the development of the proof system for H. Definition 7.7. A substitution θ is a finite set of the form {V 1 /E 1 , . . . , V n /E n }, where the V i 's are different argument variables of H and each E i is a positive expression of H having the same type as V i . We write dom(θ ) = {V 1 , . . . , V n } and range(θ ) = {E 1 , . . . , E n }. A substitution is called basic if all E i are basic expressions. A substitution is called zero-order, if type(V i ) = ι, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (notice that every zero-order substitution is also basic). The substitution corresponding to the empty set will be called the identity substitution and will be denoted by .
We are now ready to define what it means to apply a substitution θ to an expression E. Such definitions are usually complicated by the fact that one has to often rename the bound variable before applying θ to the body of a lambda abstraction. In order to simplify matters, we follow the simple approach suggested in Barendregt [1984, pp. 26-27] , which consists of the following two conventions:
-The α-congruence convention. Expressions that are α-congruent will be considered identical (expression E 1 is α-congruent with expression E 2 if E 2 results from E 1 by a series of changes of bound variables). For example, λQ.Q(a) is α-congruent to λR.R(a). -The variable convention. If expressions E 1 , . . . , E n occur in a certain mathematical context (e.g., definition, proof), then in these expressions all bound variables are chosen to be different from the free variables.
Using the variable convention, we have the following simple definition.
Definition 7.8. Let θ be a substitution and let E be a positive expression. Then, Eθ is an expression obtained from E as follows:
Notice that in the case of lambda abstraction (and similarly in the case of existential quantification), it is not needed to say "provided V ∈ FV(range(θ )) and V ∈ dom(θ )". By the variable convention this is the case.
Definition 7.9. Let θ = {V 1 /E 1 , . . . , V m /E m } and σ = {V 1 /E 1 , . . . , V n /E n } be substitutions. Then the composition θσ of θ and σ is the substitution obtained from the set
The following proposition is easy to establish. PROPOSITION 7.10. Let θ , σ and γ be substitutions. Then:
We will now define the notions of "unifier" and "most general unifier," which in our case are the same as in the case of classical first-order logic programming (notice that in the following definition, the expressions to be unified are of type ι and the substitutions involved are all zero-order). Notice that in the proposed proof system there is no higherorder unification process involved.
Definition 7.11. Let S be a set of terms of H (i.e., expressions of type ι). A zero-order substitution θ will be called a unifier of the expressions in S if the set Sθ = {Eθ | E ∈ S} is a singleton. The zero-order substitution θ will be called a most general unifier of S (denoted by mgu(S)), if for every unifier σ of the expressions in S, there exists a zero-order substitution γ such that σ = θγ .
We now have the following Substitution Lemma (see, for example, Tennent [1991] for a corresponding lemma in the case of functional programming). The Substitution Lemma shows that given a basic substitution θ , the meaning of Eθ is that of E in a certain state definable from θ . The lemma will be later used in the proof of soundness of the proposed proof system.
LEMMA 7.12 (SUBSTITUTION LEMMA). Let I be an interpretation of H and let s be a state over the domain of I. Let θ be a basic substitution and E be a positive expression. Then, Eθ s (I) = E s (I), where s (V) = θ(V) s (I) if V ∈ dom(θ ) and s (V) = s(V), otherwise.

PROOF. By structural induction on E.
The following lemmas, that also involve the notion of substitution, can be easily demonstrated and will prove useful in the sequel. LEMMA 7.13. Let θ 1 , . . . , θ n be basic substitutions. Then, θ 1 · · · θ n is also a basic substitution.
PROOF. By induction on n and using Definitions 7.1 and 7.9. LEMMA 7.14. Let I be an interpretation of H and let s be a state over the domain of I. Let λV.E 1 and E 2 be positive expressions of type ρ → π and ρ respectively. Then,
PROOF. By structural induction on E 1 . 
where B is a closed basic expression such that B (I) = s(V) (the existence of such a B is ensured by Lemma 7.6). The lemma follows by a structural induction on E.
It is important to note that in the rest of the article, the substitutions that we will use will be basic ones (unless otherwise stated). Actually, the only place where a nonbasic substitution will be needed, is when we perform a β-reduction step (see for example the rule for λ in the forthcoming Definition 7.18).
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SLD-Resolution
We now proceed to define the notions of answer and correct answer.
Definition 7.16. Let P be a program and G be a goal. An answer for P ∪ {G} is a basic substitution for (certain of the) free variables of G.
Definition 7.17. Let P be a program, G =← A be a goal clause and let θ be an answer for P ∪ {G}. We say that θ is a correct answer for P ∪ {G} if for every model M of P and for every state s over the domain of M, Aθ s (M) = true. Definition 7.18. Let P be a program and let G =← A and G =← A be goal clauses. We say that A is derived in one step from A using basic substitution θ (or equivalently that G is derived in one step from G using θ ), and we denote this fact by A θ → A (respectively, G θ → G ), if one of the following conditions applies:
Definition 7.19. Let P be a program and G be a goal. An SLD-derivation of P ∪ {G} is a (finite or infinite) sequence G 0 = G, G 1 , . . . of goals and a sequence θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . of basic substitutions such that:
(1) each G i+1 is derived in one step from G i using θ i+1 , and (2) for all i, if θ i = {V/B t } where B t is a basic template, then the free variables of B t are disjoint from all the variables that have already appeared in the derivation up to
Definition 7.20. Let P be a program and G be a goal. Assume that P ∪ {G} has a finite SLD-derivation G 0 = G, G 1 , . . . , G n with basic substitutions θ 1 , . . . , θ n , such that G n = 2. Then, we will say that P ∪ {G} has an SLD-refutation of length n using basic substitution θ = θ 1 · · · θ n .
Definition 7.21. Let P be a program, G be a goal and assume that P ∪ {G} has an SLD-refutation using basic substitution θ . Then, a computed answer σ for P ∪ {G} is the basic substitution obtained by restricting θ to the free variables of G.
Example 7.22. Consider the program of Example 3.6. An SLD-refutation of the goal ← closure Q a b is given here (where we have omitted certain simple steps involving lambda abstractions).
If we restrict the composition θ 1 · · · θ 7 to the free variables of the goal, we get the computed answer σ 1 = {Q/λX.λY.(X ≈ a)∧(Y ≈ b)}. Intuitively, σ 1 assigns to Q the relation {(a, b)} (for which the query is obviously true). Notice that by substituting Q with different basic templates, one can get answers that are "similar" to the previous one, such as for example {(a, b), (Z1, Z2)} or {(a, b), (Z1, Z2), (Z3, Z4)}, and so on. Answers of this type are in some sense "represented" by the answer {(a, b)}. Actually, one can easily optimize the proof system so as to avoid enumerating such superfluous answers (see the discussion in Section 9). However, there exist other answers to our original query that are genuinely different from {(a, b)} and can be obtained by making different clause choices. For example, another answer to our query is σ 2 = {Q/(λX.λY. ) )}, which corresponds to the relations of the form {(a, Z), (Z, b)}, for every Z in the Herbrand universe. Similarly, one can get the answer {(a, Z1), (Z1, Z2), (Z2, b)}, and so on.
In other words, we observe that by performing different choices in the selection of a basic template for Q and making an appropriate use of the two rules of the program for closure, we get an infinite (but countable) number of computed answers to our original query.
Soundness of SLD-Resolution
In this subsection we establish the soundness of the SLD-resolution proof system. The following lemmas are very useful in the proof of the soundness theorem. LEMMA 7.23. Let P be a program, let I be an interpretation of P and let s be a state over the domain of I. Let E 1 and E 2 be positive expressions of type ρ → π and let E be a positive expression of type ρ.
PROOF. Straightforward using the definition of application. PROOF. First, observe that in all cases A is of the form E E 1 · · · E k , k ≥ 0, where E is an expression of predicate type. We perform a structural induction on E.
Induction Basis. We distinguish three cases, namely E = (E ≈ E ), E = p and E = Q. For the first case it suffices to show that
, where θ is an mgu of E and E . This holds trivially since both sides are equal to true. For the second case it suffices to show that
, where θ = and p ← π E p is a clause in P. This follows easily by the fact that M is a model of P and using Lemma 7.23. The third case is trivial. Induction
Step. We examine the two most interesting cases (the rest are straightforward): Case 1: E = (λV.E ). In this case θ is the empty substitution, and therefore it suffices to show that (λV.E )
. By Lemma 7.14 we have that (λV.E ) E 1 s (M) = E {V/E 1 } s (M), and the result follows by Lemma 7.23.
. But this holds since by the induction hypothesis we have that
LEMMA 7.25. Let P be a program and G =← A be a goal. Let G 0 = G, G 1 =← A 1 , . . . , G n =← A n be an SLD-refutation of length n using basic substitutions θ 1 , . . . , θ n . Then, for every model M of P and for every state s over the domain of M,
PROOF. Using Lemma 7.24, Lemma 7.12 and induction on n.
THEOREM 7.26 (SOUNDNESS)
. Let P be a program and G =← A be a goal. Then, every computed answer for P ∪ {G} is a correct answer for P ∪ {G}.
PROOF. The result is a direct consequence of Lemma 7.25 for G n = 2 (i.e., for G n =← true).
Completeness of SLD-resolution
In order to establish the completeness of the proposed SLD-resolution, we need to first demonstrate a result that is analogous to the lifting lemma of the first-order case, [Lloyd 1987 ]. We first state (and prove in the appendix) a more technical lemma, which has as a special case the desired lifting lemma.
In the rest of this subsection, whenever we refer to a "substitution" we mean a "basic substitution". LEMMA 7.27. Let P be a program, G be a goal and let θ be a substitution. Suppose that there exists an SLD-refutation of P ∪ {Gθ } using substitution σ . Then, there exists an SLD-refutation of P ∪ {G} using a substitution δ, where for some substitution γ it holds that δγ ⊇ θσ and dom(δγ − θσ ) is a (possibly empty) set of template variables that are introduced during the refutation of P ∪ {G}.
The proof of the lemma is by induction on the length of the SLD-refutation of P ∪ {Gθ }, and is given in the Electronic Appendix, Section E. LEMMA 7.28 (LIFTING LEMMA). Let P be a program, G be a goal and let θ be a substitution. Suppose that there exists an SLD-refutation of P ∪ {Gθ } using substitution σ . Then, there exists an SLD-refutation of P ∪ {G} using a substitution δ, where for some substitution γ it holds that Gδγ = Gθσ .
PROOF. By Lemma 7.27, δγ and θσ differ only in template variables that are introduced during the refutation. By the second restriction mentioned in Definition 7.19, these variables are different from the variables in the goal G. Therefore, δγ and θσ agree on the expressions they assign to the free variables of G.
Notice that the lifting lemma differs slightly from the corresponding lemma for classical logic programming, where we actually have the equality δγ = θσ . This difference is due to the existence of template variables in the higher-order resolution proof system. Of course, if we restrict the higher-order proof system to apply to first-order logic programs, then it behaves like classical SLD-resolution and the usual lifting lemma holds.
Example 7.29. Consider any program P of our higher-order language and consider the goal clause G =← R(Z), where Z is of type ι and R of type ι → o. Let θ = {R/λX.(X ≈ a), Z/a}. Then, Gθ =← (λX. (X ≈ a) )(a). We have the following SLDrefutation:
Therefore, Gθ has an SLD-refutation with substitution σ = . On the other hand, we have the following SLD-refutation of G:
Therefore, G has an SLD-refutation with substitution δ which is equal to the composition of the substitutions {R/λX.(X ≈ X 0 )}, and
We see that δγ ⊇ θσ and dom(δγ − θσ ) = {X 0 } (which is a template variable). Moreover, it holds Gθσ = Gδγ .
Before we derive the first completeness result, we need certain definitions and lemmas.
Definition 7.30. Let P be a program and let E be a positive expression or a goal clause. We define S E to be the set of all expressions that can be obtained from E by substituting zero or more occurrences of every predicate constant p in E with the expression E 1 π · · · π E k , where p ← π E i are all the clauses 6 for p in P. Moreover, E ∈ S E is the expression obtained from E by substituting every predicate symbol occurrence with the corresponding expression.
LEMMA 7.31. Let P be a program, E be a positive expression or a goal clause, I be a Herbrand interpretation of P and let s be a Herbrand state. Then, E s (T P (I)) = E s (I).
PROOF. The proof is by structural induction on E. Assume that E is a positive expression (the proof for the case of goal clause is similar). For the induction basis we need to consider the cases where E is an argument variable V, an individual constant c, a propositional constant (false, true), or a predicate constant p. Except for the last one, all other cases are straightforward because the meaning of E is independent of T P (I) and I. For the last case assume that E 1 , . . . , E k are all the bodies of the rules defining p in P. By definition of the T P operator, it holds that
. This completes the basis case. For the induction step, all cases are immediate.
LEMMA 7.32. Let P be a program, G,G be goals and G ∈ 
PROOF. The proof is by induction on the number m of top-level subexpressions of the goal G that are connected with the logical constant ∧. The basis case is for m = 1, that is, it applies to goal clauses G that do not contain a top-level ∧. Assume that G =← A. The cases we need to examine for A for the induction basis are the following:
, and (∃V A). The only nontrivial case is A = (p A 1 · · · A n ), which we demonstrate. Assume that p is defined in P with a set of k rules with right-hand sides
-A = E p and E p contains exactly one disjunct. Then this disjunct must be a lambda abstraction of the form (λV.A ). This implies that
On the other hand, G → H 1 , where
This completes the proof for the basis case. For the induction step, the goal must be of the form
By the induction hypothesis, since A 1
H, where H ∈ S H . This completes the proof for the induction step and the lemma. LEMMA 7.33. Let P be a program, G,G be goals and G ∈ S G . If there exists an SLDrefutation for P ∪ {G } using substitution θ , then there also exists an SLD-refutation for P ∪ {G} using the same substitution θ .
PROOF. The proof is by induction on the length n of the refutation of P ∪ {G }. The induction basis is for n = 1 and includes the following cases for G: ((λV. true) E) and (∃V true). It can be easily verified that the lemma holds for all these cases.
Suppose now that the result holds for n − 1. We demonstrate that it also holds for n. Let G = G 0 , G 1 , . . . , G n be the derived goals of the SLD-refutation of G using the sequence of substitutions θ 1 , . . . , θ n . Since G θ 1 → G 1 , by Lemma 7.32 there exists a goal G 1 such that G θ 1 G 1 and G 1 ∈ S G 1 . By the induction hypothesis, P ∪ {G 1 } has an SLD-refutation using θ 2 · · · θ n . It follows that P ∪ {G} also has an SLD-refutation using θ = θ 1 · · · θ n .
COROLLARY 7.34. Let P be a program and G be a goal. If there exists an SLDrefutation for P ∪ { G} using substitution θ , then there also exists an SLD-refutation for P ∪ {G} using the same substitution θ . The proof of the lemma can be found in the Electronic Appendix, Section F.
As in the first-order case, we have various forms of completeness. We can now prove the analogue of a theorem due to Apt and van Emden (see Apt [1990, Lemma 3.17] or Lloyd [1987, Theorem 8.3] PROOF. We prove by induction on n that if A s (T P ↑ n) = true for all Herbrand states s, then P ∪ {G} has an SLD-refutation with computed answer equal to the identity substitution. For n = 0 the proof is a direct consequence of Lemma 7.35. Now suppose that the result holds for n − 1. For the induction step assume that A s (T P ↑ n) = true for all s. By Lemma 7.31, A s (T P ↑ (n − 1)) = true. By the induction hypothesis there exists an SLD-refutation for P ∪ { G} with computed answer equal to the identity substitution. Let θ be the composition of the substitutions that are used during the SLD-refutation of P ∪ { G}. By Corollary 7.34, P ∪ {G} also has an SLDrefutation using the same substitution θ . The restriction of θ to the free variables of G is equal to the restriction of θ to the free variables of G which is equal to the empty substitution. Therefore, P ∪ {G} has an SLD-refutation with computed answer equal to the identity substitution.
The following theorem generalizes a result of Hill [1974] (see also Apt [1990, Theorem 3.15] ). THEOREM 7.37. Let P be a program and G =← A be a goal. Suppose that P ∪ {G} is unsatisfiable. Then, there exists an SLD-refutation of P ∪ {G}.
PROOF. Since P ∪ {G} is unsatisfiable and since M P is a model of P, we conclude that G s (M P ) = false, for some state s. Therefore, A s (M P ) = true. By Lemma 7.15 we can construct a substitution θ such that Aθ s (M P ) = true for all Herbrand states s . By Theorem 7.36, there exists an SLD-refutation for P ∪ {Gθ }. By Lemma 7.28 there exists an SLD-refutation for P ∪ {G}.
Finally, the following theorem is a generalization of Clark's theorem [Clark 1979 ] (see also the more accessible Apt [1990, Theorem 3.18] ) for the higher-order case. THEOREM 7.38 (COMPLETENESS). Let P be a program and G =← A be a goal. For every correct answer θ for P ∪ {G}, there exists an SLD-refutation for P ∪ {G} with computed answer δ and a substitution γ such that Gθ = Gδγ .
PROOF. Since θ is a correct answer for P∪{← A}, it follows that Aθ s (M P ) = true for all Herbrand states s. By Theorem 7.36, P∪{Gθ } has an SLD-refutation with computed answer equal to the identity substitution. This means that if σ is the composition of the substitutions used in the refutation of P ∪ {Gθ }, then Gθσ = Gθ . By Lemma 7.28 there exists an SLD-refutation for P ∪ {G} using substitution δ such that for some substitution γ , Gδ γ = Gθσ . Let δ be δ restricted to the variables in G. Then, it also holds that Gδ γ = Gδγ , and therefore Gδγ = Gθσ = Gθ .
RELATED WORK
In this section we present various approaches to higher-order logic programming that are directly or indirectly connected to the work reported in this article.
The Origins
The basic notions underlying our work can be traced back to certain classical ideas from computability theory as-well-as to ideas from domain theory. Starting back in 1959, Kleene and Kreisel introduced in Kleene [1959] and Kreisel [1959] respectively, what are now known as the Kleene-Kreisel continuous functionals. The key idea in both of these works was to construct a hierarchy of functionals where the behavior of functional on input can be determined through finite "approximations" to and . There is an obvious conceptual link to our work in which the behavior of a program predicate is described in terms of its behavior on the compact elements of the domain corresponding to its argument type.
The work of Kleene and Kreisel has very close connections to the development of domain theory in Theoretical Computer Science (see, for example, Normann [2006] for a more detailed discussion on the relationship between the two areas). Roughly speaking, domain theory was developed in order to solve recursive definitions (of functions, data-structures, etc.) that often appear in Computer Science. The problem we have considered in this article is exactly of this type: we are given a set of recursively defined higher-order predicates and we are seeking the least solution of this set of definitions. Our solution to the problem has actually used many mainstream tools from domain theory (e.g., algebraic lattices, least fixed-point theorem, and so on). What is new in our approach is that our constructions are performed in a logic programming setting (and not in a functional or an imperative one); moreover, our language has the novel characteristic of supporting uninstantiated higher-order variables, a fact that led us to a novel way of interpreting types and to a new, nonstandard interpretation of application.
Extensional Higher-Order Logic Programming
Work on extensional higher-order logic programming is rather limited. Apart from the results of Wadge [1991] 7 , the only other work that has come to our attention is that of M. Bezem [Bezem 1999 [Bezem , 2001 ], who considers higher-order logic programming languages with syntax similar to that of Wadge [1991] .
Wadge's approach. Wadge [1991] , identifies a fragment of higher-order logic programming that is argued to have an extensional semantics. In this fragment, (i) predicate constants cannot appear as parameters in the heads of clauses, (ii) predicate variables that appear in the body of a clause must also appear in its head, and (iii) predicate variables cannot appear in goal clauses. Wadge provides a standard semantics for this language [Wadge 1991, page 292] in which the denotations of types are not restricted, that is, the denotation of π 1 → π 2 is the set of all functions from the denotation of π 1 to the denotation of π 2 . Under this semantics, it is claimed [Wadge 1991 ] that every program has a unique minimum model that assigns to predicates continuous relations. The ideas of Wadge [1991] are indeed intriguing, but the main argument contains a flaw (which however can be corrected by altering the semantics). More specifically, a careful examination of Wadge [1991] reveals that if the denotations of types are not somehow restricted, then the main theorem of the paper (the second theorem in page 296 of Wadge [1991] ) does not hold.
Example 8.1. We give an example which demonstrates that if in the fragment of Wadge [1991] one allows the universally quantified variables to range over arbitrary relations, then the intended model of the program will not in general be continuous. This contradicts the second theorem in page 296 of Wadge [1991] which states that the minimum Herbrand model of a higher-order program is continuous. Actually, the construction of the minimum Herbrand model itself sketched in Wadge [1991] does not seem to work either, if the domains contain arbitrary relations.
Consider the program:
where the type of apply is
The intended model of the program assigns to apply the relation apply which contains all pairs (r, s) such that s ∈ r. We demonstrate that apply is not continuous if we allow the implicit universal quantifiers to range over all relations of the corresponding types.
Consider the relation nat = {0, 1, 2, . . .} of type ι → o and the relation allnat = {nat} of type (ι → o) → o. It is easy to see that allnat is not continuous. Consider now the following directed subset of the domain of apply: {(allnat, ∅), (allnat, {0}), (allnat, {0, 1}), . . .}. Obviously, it holds apply(allnat, ∅) = apply(allnat, {0}) = · · · = false while apply(allnat, nat) = true. In other words, apply is not continuous.
Based on the same lines of reasoning, if our domains are arbitrary then the operators K i used in the sketch of the proof of Wadge [1991, pp. 296-297] are not continuous and therefore Kleene's fixpoint theorem cannot be applied to get the minimum model result.
As we realized in the first steps of our research for the present article, if we restrict the domains to contain only continuous functions, then all theorems of Wadge [1991] hold exactly as stated and the flaw is corrected. More specifically, given a nonempty set D, the definition of the semantics of types in Wadge [1991, p. 292] can be altered as follows (we use · * D to denote the new semantics).
, that is, the set of continuous functions from π 1 * D to π 2 * D . The corresponding partial orders can be easily defined as in Definition 5.1. The semantics of expressions can be defined in an analogous way as in Definition 5.8, the main difference being that the semantics of application is the standard one. In the following, we will refer to this semantics as the "continuous semantics."
It is easy to check that under the continuous semantics every higher-order logic program (of the fragment considered in Wadge [1991] ) has a unique minimum Herbrand model and this model assigns continuous denotations to all predicates of the program. Moreover, it is straightforward to see that the continuous semantics also applies to the richer language we consider in this article, that is, a language allowing uninstantiated predicate variables in clauses.
The continuous semantics was the first semantics we considered when we started the research reported in this article. However, we soon also realized that although the continuous semantics is quite appropriate for the fragment considered in Wadge [1991] , it is not very convenient when the language allows occurrences of uninstantiated predicate variables in clauses. Consider a goal clause of the form ←p(R), where p is defined in our program and has type (ι → o) → o. Then, the continuous semantics dictates that we should examine all possible relations of type ι → o for possible solutions. This set of relations is uncountable. Of course we know that since the denotation of p in the least model of the program is continuous, there must be some finite set that satisfies p. This finiteness property is of vital importance in order to devise any sound and complete proof system for our fragment. The problem, as we understood it, was that the continuous semantics does not reflect the finiteness property directly. In other words, we needed a semantics which would make the finiteness more explicit.
Actually, there appear to be close connections between the semantics proposed in this article and the continuous semantics. It is relatively easy to show that for every argument type ρ of H there is a bijection between the sets ρ D and ρ * D . Similarly, there is a bijection between the set of interpretations of H under the proposed semantics and the set of interpretations of H under the continuous semantics. Then, the following proposition can be established. PROPOSITION 8.2. Let P be a program and let F be a formula of H. Then, F is a logical consequence of P under the proposed semantics iff F is a logical consequence of P under the continuous semantics.
An outline of the proof of the proposition is given in the Electronic Appendix, Section G.
What the proposition suggests is that the two semantics, despite their differences, are closely related. The key advantage of the proposed semantics is that it is much closer to the SLD-resolution proof system that is introduced in Section 7. More specifically.
-The compact elements of our algebraic lattices correspond to the basic expressions that are a vital characteristic of the proposed proof system (see Subsection 7.1). -The notion of answer and correct answer for a query (see Definitions 7.16 and 7.17) can now be accurately defined. Notice that the notion of correct answer must be quite close to that of computed answer in order to be able to state the main completeness theorem.
In conclusion, the proposed semantics allows us to define an SLD-resolution proof system and it helps us formalize and prove its completeness. It is unclear to us whether (and how) this could have been accomplished by relying on the continuous semantics.
Bezem's approach. In Bezem [2001] a notion of extensionality is defined (called the extensional collapse) and it is demonstrated that many logic programs are extensional under this notion; however, this notion appears to differ from classical extensionality and has a more proof-theoretical flavor.
The source language considered by Bezem is quite close to the one we adopt in this article. The "hoapata" programs defined in Bezem [2001] are higher-order logic programs in which the higher-order arguments (hoa) can only be passed (p), applied (a) and/or thrown away (ta). In particular, all higher-order arguments in the head of a clause, are distinct variables. Roughly speaking, these restrictions define a language that is syntactically similar to ours.
However, the semantics of hoapata programs defined in Bezem [2001] appears to differ significantly from the semantics of H. As it was pointed out to us by one of the reviewers, one important difference can be seen when considering queries with uninstantiated predicate variables. More specifically, given the program:
the query ←p(R) will not return any answer under the approach of Bezem [2001] . Under our semantics, we will get basic expressions (representing sets), as discussed in the previous sections. However, if the two facts:
are added to the program, then Bezem's approach will return the answer R = nat, while our approach will continue to return the same answers (basic expressions). This difference in behavior when evaluating queries with uninstantiated higher-order arguments, can also be observed when comparing our approach with that of λProlog and HiLog. A more careful discussion of this issue is given at the end of the following section.
Intensional Higher-Order Logic Programming
Research on intensional higher-order logic programming is much more extended. The two main existing approaches in this area are represented by the languages λProlog and HiLog. Both systems have mature implementations and have been tested in various application domains. It should be noted that both λProlog and HiLog encourage a form of higher-order programming that extends in various ways the higher-order programming capabilities that are supported by functional programming languages. For a more detailed discussion on this issue, see Nadathur and Miller [1998, Section 7.4 ].
In the rest of this section, we give a brief presentation of certain characteristics of these two systems that are related to their intensional behavior (i.e., characteristics that will help the reader further clarify the differences between the intensional and extensional approaches). A detailed discussion on the syntax, semantics, implementation and applications of the two languages, is outside the scope of this article (and the interested reader can consult the relevant bibliography).
λProlog. The language was initially designed in the late 1980s [Miller and Nadathur 1986; Nadathur 1987; Nadathur and Miller 1990] in order to provide a proof theoretic basis for logic programming. The syntax of λProlog is based on the intuitionistic theory of higher-order hereditary Harrop formulas. The resulting language is a powerful one, that allows the programmer to quantify over function and predicate variables, to use λ-abstractions in terms, and so on. The semantics of λProlog is not extensional (see for example the discussion in Nadathur and Miller [1998] ). The following simple example illustrates this idea.
Example 8.3. Consider the λProlog program (we omit type declarations). r p. p X :-q X. q X :-p X.
The goal ←(r q) fails for the given program.
Notice that due to the unit clause r p., the program is not a valid H program. Actually, as it was first remarked in Wadge [1991, Example in pages 292-293] , if predicate constants are used as parameters in the heads of clauses in a higher-order language, then there does not appear to exist any straightforward way to achieve an extensional minimum-model semantics. In conclusion, λProlog has a very general syntax; this makes the language very powerful from an expressive point of view, but more demanding from a semantic point of view.
Since the syntax of H is restricted with respect to that of λProlog, in order to compare the two systems, we restrict attention to the syntax of H. In general, we believe that programs of H that do not involve uninstantiated higher-order variables will have a similar behavior in λProlog and under our proof system (see also the discussion and conjecture at the end of this subsection). For programs or queries that contain uninstantiated higher-order variables, the two systems have in general a different behavior. Consider for example the band example given in the introductory section, and the query ←band(B). This goal is not generally a meaningful one for λProlog because there exist too many suitable answer substitutions (i.e., predicate terms) for B that one could think of (see the relevant discussion in Nadathur and Miller [1998, p. 50] ). Notice that there exists at least one suitable answer for B, namely, the top relation λx. that is true of everything, which can be taken as the desired answer in such queries (see again Nadathur and Miller [1998, p. 50] ). Our approach in such queries is quite different: the SLD-resolution will enumerate the possible bands (sets) that can be formed given the information in the program. For example, B = {sally, dave, grace} is one such band. We believe that such queries that return sets as answers add a nice new characteristic to higher-order logic programming that deserves to be better investigated.
HiLog. The language possesses a higher-order syntax and a first-order semantics [Chen et al. 1989 [Chen et al. , 1993 . It extends classical logic programming quite naturally, and allows the programmer to write in a concise way programs that would be rather awkward to code in Prolog. It has been used in various application domains (e.g., deductive and object-oriented databases, modular logic programming, and so on).
As it is the case with λProlog, HiLog also differs from H in the way that it handles queries with higher-order uninstantiated arguments. For example, the ←band(R) query will fail in HiLog since there is no actual band defined in the program. However, consider the program: married(john,mary).
Then, the query:
?-R(john,mary).
is a meaningful one for HiLog, and the interpreter will respond with R = married. Intuitively, the interpreter searches the program for possible candidate relations and tests them one by one. Of course, if there is no binary relation defined in the program, the query will fail.
This program behavior can be best explained by the following comment from Chen et al. [1993] : "in HiLog predicates and other higher-order syntactic objects are not equal unless they (i.e., their names) are equated explicitly." Some remarks. From the given discussion, it turns out that the four languages, namely H, the "hoapata" language, λProlog and HiLog, seem to have the same behavior when restricted to the fragment proposed in Wadge [1991] . This is something we had observed during the course of this research and which was also pointed out to us by two of the reviewers of the article. It would be interesting (and certainly nontrivial) to establish this behavioral equivalence in a formal way (i.e., by using the semantics of each language in order to demonstrate that for the particular fragment all four languages have the same logical consequences). Of course, as we have seen before, the addition of uninstantiated predicate variables, differentiates H from the other three proposals.
Notice that despite the fact that the four languages seem to have the same behavior when restricted to the fragment of Wadge [1991] , the proposed approach appears to have an important distinguishing characteristic: since it is based on an extension of classical logic programming, one can use well-established techniques in order to demonstrate program equivalence, the correctness of transformations, and so on (e.g., by using induction on the approximations to the least fixpoint of the immediate consequence operator).
Other Approaches
There exist other approaches in the study of higher-order logic that appear to be connected to higher-order logic programming. One such approach is reported in Benzmüller et al. [2004] , in which the semantics of classical higher-order logic is reexamined with the goal of characterizing the deductive power of existing higher-order theorem provers. More specifically, Church's simply typed λ-calculus is considered as the source language and nine classes of models are identified. Roughly speaking, the classes are distinguished based on "the amount of extensionality" that is present in each one of them.
The work of Benzmüller et al. [2004] is interesting because the classes of models can be used in order to study and classify existing higher-order theorem provers of varying capabilities. Moreover, as the authors point out (Section 8.1, page 1085 of Benzmüller et al. [2004] ), it is possible that their results may be relevant to higher-order logic programming and in particular to the semantic study of λProlog.
FUTURE WORK
There are several aspects of this work, both theoretical and practical, that can be further investigated. In the following, we briefly discuss some of them.
Semantics. The discussion of the related approaches in Section 8 leaves open some interesting questions that deserve to be further investigated.
First of all, it would be interesting to investigate whether the four different languages mentioned in Section 8 (namely H, "hoapata" programs, λProlog and HiLog) coincide semantically when restricted to the fragment of "definitional programs" introduced in Wadge [1991] . If such an equivalence holds, then its demonstration must be nontrivial (mainly due to the fact that all four formalisms use different semantic approaches).
A second important question stems from the continuous semantics outlined in Section 8.2. It would be interesting to examine whether a proof system can be defined for H programs which will be sound and complete with respect to the continuous semantics. Such an approach would seem more "mainstream" since it would (for example) avoid the nonstandard semantics of application given in Definition 5.8. Implementation. A prototype implementation of the proposed proof system has been performed in Haskell. 8 A detailed description of the implementation is outside the scope of this article. However, in the following we outline certain points that we feel are important.
The main difference in comparison to a first-order implementation, is that the proof system has to generate an infinite (yet enumerable) number of basic templates. In order to make more efficient the production of the basic templates, one main optimization has been adopted. As we have already mentioned in Definition 7.3, a basic template is a nonempty finite union of basic expressions of a particularly simple form. In the implementation, the members of this union are generated in a "demand-driven way," as the following examples illustrate.
Example 9.1. Consider the query ← (R a b),(R c d). The proposed proof system would try some basic templates until it finds one that satisfies the query. However, if it first tries the basic template (λX.λY.(X ≈ Z)∧(Y ≈ W)) then this will obviously not lead to an answer (since a relation that satisfies the query must contain at least two pairs of elements). In order to avoid such cases, our implementation initially produces a basic expression that consists of the union of a basic template with an uninstantiated variable (say L) of the same type as the template; intuitively, L represents a (yet undetermined) set of basic templates that may be needed later during resolution and which need not yet be explicitly generated. In our example, the implementation starts with the production of an expression of the form (λX.λY.(X ≈ Z)∧(Y ≈ W)) L. When the second application in the goal is reached, then a second basic template will be generated together with a new uninstantiated variable (say L1). The final answer to the query will be an expression of the form: (λX.λY.(X ≈ a)∧(Y ≈ b)) (λX.λY.(X ≈ c)
L1. The intuitive meaning of the given answer is that the query is satisfied by all relations that contain at least the pairs (a, b) and (c, d).
Notice that an important practical advantage of this optimization is that a unique answer to the given query is generated. Notice also that if the formal proof system of the previous sections was followed faithfully in the implementation, then an infinite number of answers would be generated: an answer representing the two-element relation {(a, b), which intuitively correspond to relations of the following forms:
Intuitively, these answers state that the pair (a, b) belongs to the transitive closure of all relations that contain at least the pair (a, b) ; moreover, it also belongs to the transitive closure of all relations that contain at least two pairs of the form (a, Z) and (Z, b) for any Z, and so on.
We conjecture that these ideas can be used in order to define a new, more efficient proof procedure for H which will also be sound and complete with respect to the semantics introduced in this article. Of course, an attempt in this direction would mean that the notions of basic expression and basic template would have to be altered: the present definitions do not allow a basic expression to be the union of a predicate variable (like L in the given examples) with another basic expression. We believe that all the proofs of Section 7 can be adapted in order to work under the new definitions and the new proof procedure, but this has to be further investigated. We are currently considering issues regarding an extended WAM-based implementation of the ideas presented in the article. We believe that ideas originating from graph-reduction [Field and Harrison 1988] will also prove vital in the development of this extended implementation.
Other Extensions. Another interesting direction for future research is the extension of our higher-order fragment with negation-as-failure. The semantics of negation in a higher-order setting could probably be captured model-theoretically using the purely logical characterization of the well-founded semantics through an appropriate infinitevalued logic given in Rondogiannis and Wadge [2005] . Apart from negation, we are currently investigating extensions of the language H that will allow a new programming style to be developed, one which will employ in a vital way the higher-order characteristics of the language. This is probably the most important direction for future work.
Also, it would be interesting to investigate whether it is possible to build a higherorder logic programming language that would combine both extensional and intensional characteristics. Designing such a language would obviously be important because such a system could embody all the benefits from both the extensional and the intensional approaches.
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